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Abstract 
In this paper, I examine the relation between Integrated Reporting (IR) and the composition of a firm’s 
investor base. I hypothesize and find that firms that practice IR have a more long-term oriented investor 
base with more dedicated and fewer transient investors. This result is more pronounced for firms with high 
growth opportunities, not controlled by a family, operating in ‘sin’ industries, and exhibiting more stable 
IR practice over time. I find that the results are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects, controls for the 
quantity of sustainability disclosure, and alternative ways of measuring IR. Moreover, I show that investor 
activism on environmental or social issues or a large number of concerns about a firm’s environmental or 
social impact leads a firm to practice more IR and that this investor or crisis-induced IR affects the 
composition of a firm’s investor base. 
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1.  Introduction 
Integrated Reporting (IR) is a relatively new phenomenon in the world of corporate reporting that has gained 
significant momentum in the last ten years. The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) defines 
IR as “a process founded on integrated thinking that results in a periodic integrated report by an organization 
about  value  creation  over  time  and  related  communications  regarding  aspects  of  value  creation.  An 
integrated  report  is  a  concise  communication  about  how  an  organization’s  strategy,  governance, 
performance and prospects, in the context of its external environment, lead to the creation of value in the 
short, medium and long term.” Its pilot program included, as of 2013, more than 100 large multinational 
companies supported by an investor network with more than 40 members with the IIRC defining long-term 
investors as the primary audience for IR. For example, in the US, Pfizer, American Electric Power, Clorox 
and  Southwest  Airlines  have  self-labeled  their  reports  as  integrated.  Many  more  though  integrate 
sustainability data in their financial reports, while not labeling them as integrated.1 While more companies 
are increasingly practicing some type of IR and more investors are starting to use the reported data we still 
have a very limited understanding of the effects of IR.  
In this paper, I investigate the relation between IR and the composition of a firm’s investor base. 
Specifically, I hypothesize and test whether firms that practice IR tend to have more dedicated investors 
and less transient investors, and as a result a more long-term oriented investor base. Anecdotal evidence 
suggest that such a link could exist. For example, American Electric Power, one of the first companies in 
the US to self-declare its report as integrated, exhibits an investor base that is characterized by lower 
portfolio turnover relative to competitors, such as AES Corporation. Similarly, the institutional investors 
of Dow Chemical, a company that has long integrated sustainability data in its annual report, exhibit low 
portfolio  turnover  relative  to  those  of  Monsanto,  a  competitor  in  agricultural  solutions.  Moreover, 
practitioners argue that the attraction of long-term investors is a consequence of adopting IR. While 
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satisfaction,  product  quality  metrics,  water  and  energy  consumption,  training  of  employees  in  anticorruption 
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anecdotal evidence suggest the presence of a link and many practitioners argue for its existence, no 
empirical evidence have been provided to establish such a relation. 
IR comes as a response to criticisms that disconnected financial and sustainability reporting are not 
effective in describing the long-term value creation process inside the organization. Proponents of IR argue 
that companies should supplement the financial information they are required to report based on accounting 
standards with other nonfinancial information that is of interest to shareholders, such as on customers, 
employees, and the environment. Common reasons cited by those making this argument include: (1) 
financial information  is a lagging indicator, a “rear-view mirror” of the company’s performance, (2) 
nonfinancial information can provide insights into the company’s expected future financial performance, 
and (3) for most companies their market value exceeds their book value so additional reporting can provide 
information on a company’s intangible assets that are not captured on the balance sheet.2  
Similarly, proponents of IR argue that separate sustainability reporting, although providing relevant 
information for multiple stakeholders, is unlikely to be an effective mechanism to communicate to investors 
a firm’s performance on environmental and social issues and how they relate to financial performance 
(Eccles and Krzus 2010). The argument goes that in sustainability reports the data are not placed in the 
context of a company’s strategy and business model, are less credible and timely compared to the financial 
data that are audited at a higher level of assurance and are released sooner, and the concept of materiality 
is not effectively addressed. Therefore, while sustainability data are argued to be value relevant, the 
aforementioned factors impede their decision usefulness from an investor perspective. 
Many  commentators  have  argued  that  because  IR  could  be  a  more  effective  mechanism  to 
communicate a firm’s capacity to create value in the long-term, firms that practice IR might find themselves 
to look more attractive to long-term investors. However, whether IR indeed is a more effective managerial 
tool to communicate a firm’s long-term prospects is an open empirical question and no evidence have been 
                                                           
2 Robert Eccles, “The Performance Measurement Manifesto,” The Harvard Business Review, v. 69, is. 1, 1991, p. 
131-137.  See also Robert Eccles, Robert Herz, Mary Keegan, and David Phillips. The Value Reporting Revolution: 
Moving Beyond the Earnings Game. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2001).    4 
 
provided to support these claims. Therefore, I seek to provide empirical evidence on whether firms that 
practice IR tend to have a more long-term oriented investor base.  
My interest in this relation originates from the fact that the type of investors that own the shares of 
a firm can affect managerial decision-making and corporate value.3 For example, Bushee (1998) finds that 
managers are less likely to cut R&D to reverse an earnings d ecline when institutional ownership is high, 
but a large proportion of ownership by  transient investors significantly increases the probability that 
managers reduce R&D to reverse an earnings decline. Similarly, Matsumoto (2002) documents that firms 
with higher presence of transient investors are more likely to avoid negative earnings surprises through 
earnings and expectations management. Chen, Harford and Li (2007) show that long -term investors are 
effective monitors and their level of holdings  is positively related to  post-merger performance and the 
withdrawal probability of bad bids. Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005) show that firms with high levels of 
short-term investor holdings have lower bid premiums and larger post -acquisition underperformance 
consistent with weaker monitoring allowing managers to proceed with value -reducing acquisitions or to 
bargain for personal benefits against shareholder returns. Zahra, Neubaum and Huse (2000) show that high 
levels of dedicated investors are associated with higher  levels of corporate entrepreneurship while high 
levels of transient investors are associated with lower levels.   These results  collectively  indicate that 
transient  institutional investors encourage myopic investment behavior   and earning management; in 
contrast, ownership by dedicated investors serves to reduce pressures on managers for myopic investment 
behavior.  
The analytical model of Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2005) yields similar results. They model 
a capital market with overconfident investors   where  stock prices have two components: a long -run 
fundamental value and a short-term speculative component. They show that in times of great heterogeneity 
in investor beliefs the optimal incentive contract is designed by investors to partially or completely induce 
                                                           
3  For  a  discussion  see  Drexel  University  Center  for  Corporate  Governance  Roundtable  on  Risk  Management, 
Corporate Governance, and the Search for Long-term Investors. 2010. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 22 (4): 
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the CEO to pursue a strategy that maximizes the speculative component by pursuing short-term speculative 
projects  even  at  the  expense  of  long-run  fundamental  value.  Critically,  the  more  long-term  oriented 
shareholders are, the less likely they are to encourage managers to engage in short-termist behavior. 
Practitioners also argue for a link between a firm’s investor base and managerial decision making, with 
many corporate executives and board members fearing that short-term investors encourage short-termism 
and affect adversely long-term financial performance (Barton and Weisman 2014). As a result of the 
evidence above, many executives are beginning to actively seek long-term investors. 
I construct a sample of 1,114 unique US-listed firms, for which I have data both on the degree of 
IR practice and the investor base, between 2002 and 2010. I find that more IR is associated with a more 
long-term investor base, defined as the difference in the percentage of shares held by dedicated and transient 
investors. This result holds after controlling for other known determinants of the type of investors owning 
shares in a firm. Moreover, the results remain unaffected when I control for the quantity of sustainability 
metrics disclosed by a firm, whether a company issues a sustainability report, follows Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) guidelines, and the economic, environmental, social, and governance (EESG) performance 
of the firm. Therefore, the effect of IR on investor base is incremental to a firm’s sustainability reporting 
practices and the level of its EESG performance.  
I conduct a battery of tests to address potential empirical biases. Specifications that replace industry 
with firm fixed effects yield very similar results suggesting that a firm-persistent correlated omitted variable 
cannot explain the association between IR and investor base. Changes models that lag either changes in IR 
or changes in investor base composition suggest that lagged IR change is correlated with future changes in 
investor base, although the statistical significance of the association is moderate. I find no significant 
association between lagged changes in investor base and future IR changes suggesting that reverse causality 
where a more long-term investor base forces a firm to practice more IR is unlikely to be the source of the 
documented association between the two constructs.  
 I show that the strength of the effect of IR on investor clientele is moderated by several variables. 
First,  I  find  some  evidence  that  firms  with  higher  price-to-book  ratios  and  as  a  result  more  growth 6 
 
opportunities  exhibit  a  stronger  relation  between  IR  and  investor  clientele,  consistent  with  IR 
communicating information that is valuable for assessing the long-term prospects of a business; information 
that is needed more for firms with high growth opportunities. Second, I find that the relation is stronger for 
firms  that  are  not  family  controlled.  Because  family  firms  have  been  shown  to  exhibit  a  long-term 
orientation and a better performance on environmental and social metrics (Le Breton-Miller and Miller 
2006), one can think about IR and family ownership as substitute signals of a firm’s ability to integrate 
sustainability considerations in the business. Third, the relation between IR and investor clientele is stronger 
in industries that are under severe pressure from regulation and shifting social expectations. Probably the 
best example of companies under such pressure are firms operating in ‘sin’ industries such as alcohol, 
firearms, and tobacco. I find that for these firms there is a stronger relation between IR and investor 
clientele. Finally, consistent with accounting theories that emphasize the importance of commitment in 
disclosure (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000) I find that the relation between IR and investor clientele is negatively 
moderated when firms have exhibited in the past high volatility in their IR practice. 
In  addition,  I  exploit  two  events  to  understand  how  they  influence  IR  and  the  subsequent 
composition of a firm’s investor base. First, using KLD data I identify firms that experience a sustainability 
crisis as companies that have a large number of environmental, human rights, product, diversity, and 
employee related concerns. Past research has shown that these crises serve as a catalyst for firms to engage 
with sustainability and become more transparent about their environmental or social impact (Eccles, Miller 
and Serafeim 2012). I show that firms that have a large number of such concerns subsequently practice 
more IR and the predicted component of this increased IR is related to a more long-term investor base in 
the future. I also conduct an analysis to understand the role of investor activism on social and environmental 
issues. I collect data on all shareholder resolutions filed for US-listed companies related to social and 
environmental issues and find that firms for which investors file shareholder resolutions on these issues 
increase their IR score and that this increase in IR is associated with an increase in long-term investor base. 
This result suggests that investor engagement is an effective mechanism of promoting IR.  7 
 
In additional tests, I separately estimate the effect of IR on dedicated and transient investors to 
understand which investor type is driving the results. I find a consistently significant association between 
dedicated investors and IR, with firms that practice more IR having a higher percentage of their shares held 
by dedicated investors. I find a negative coefficient on IR when the dependent variable is the percentage of 
share held by transient investors but it obtains significance only in some specifications. An interpretation 
of this result is that firms practicing IR not only attract dedicated investors but also in some cases become 
unattractive  for  transient  investors.  Importantly,  I  find  that  investor-induced  IR  from  shareholder 
engagement increases the percentage of shares held by dedicated investors but it does not affect the 
percentage of shares held by transient investors. This is in contrast to crisis-induced IR which does not 
affect the percentage of shares held by dedicated investors but it does reduce the percentage of shares held 
by transient investors.  
I  also  test the  robustness of  the results to the  use of  an  alternative  IR  variable  provided  by 
Sustainable Asset Management, the firm that constructs the Dow Jones Sustainability index. The variable 
measures  whether  environmental  or  social  narrative  information  or  key  performance  indicators  are 
integrated in annual reports. Using this alternative variable for 2010 for a smaller sample of US firms, yields 
results that are similar to the main results. There is a positive association between IR practice and the 
percentage of shares held by long-term investors. In addition, I conduct a preliminary analysis that attempts 
to isolate the mechanism through which IR leads to a more long-term investor base. Specifically, I analyze 
the relative importance of increased relevance, reliability and timeliness of the sustainability data due to IR 
and find that primarily relevance and timeliness are the mechanisms that lead to a more long-term investor 
base. 
This  paper  contributes  to  an  emerging  literature  that  seeks  to  understand  the  causes  and 
consequences of sustainability and integrated reporting. Ioannou and Serafeim (2013) show that mandating 
sustainability reporting influences managerial practices and improves firms’ environmental, social, and 
governance  (ESG)  performance.  Cheng,  Ioannou,  and  Serafeim  (2014)  find  that  firms  with  more 
sustainability disclosure face lower capital constraints and as a result better access to finance while Dhaliwal 8 
 
et al. (2011) find that firms with more sustainability disclosure have lower cost of equity capital. This paper 
documents  that integrating  sustainability  information  within  the financial  reporting  context  shifts the 
investor clientele of a firm towards dedicated and away from transient investors.  
Moreover, the paper contributes to the literature that examines how companies cater to different 
types of investors. Bushee and Noe (2000) find that firms with higher disclosure rankings attract more 
transient investors. They attribute this to the increase in stock liquidity which makes the company more 
attractive to transient investors. Their emphasis is on transient investors while I concentrate primarily on 
the direct effect of IR on dedicated investors. Brochet, Loumioti, and Serafeim (2013) show that firms 
communicating more long-term information during their conference calls have a more long-term oriented 
investor base and are followed by sell-side analysts that are more likely to issue long-term forecasts. I find 
that IR is a corporate reporting innovation that serves as an important determinant of the composition of a 
firm’s investor base. 
    The remaining of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the hypothesis development. 
Section 3 describes the sample and the data used in this study. Section 4 describes the results. Section 5 
concludes. 
   
2.  Hypothesis Development 
Information asymmetry between managers and investors present frictions in the capital allocation process 
restricting access to finance for corporations (Hubbard 1998). The higher the information asymmetry the 
more likely it is that investors will ask for a risk premium as a reward for allocating capital to companies 
under incomplete information (Merton 1987). Moreover, the higher the information asymmetry the higher 
are the costs of monitoring for institutional investors further increasing frictions (Healy and Palepu 2001). 
However, investors differ on their time horizons with dedicated investors actively buying and holding 
stocks for longer periods of time compared to transient investors. Long-term investors are more likely to 9 
 
hold shares in companies that provide more information about their long-term prospects since for them the 
information is relevant in assessing the value of the firm and in monitoring management over time. 
Sustainability  information  in  the  form  of  environmental  and  social  data  is  a  relatively  new 
development that has been increasingly reported by a larger number of firms around the world. Not only 
the number of companies reporting sustainability information but also the number of investors using this 
information  has  been  increasing.  The  number  of  signatories  to  the  United  Nations  Principles  for 
Responsible Investment (UNPRI) has increased from 100 in 2006 representing $4 trillion in assets under 
management to 1,188 in 2013 representing $34 trillion (Eccles and Serafeim, 2013). Investor interest in 
sustainability data is also evidenced by the large number of investors accessing sustainability data on 
Bloomberg terminals (Eccles, Krzus and Serafeim 2011). While sustainability data could be relevant over 
any timeframe, it is often argued that they are primarily informative about the long-term prospects of the 
business. Consistent with this idea it is primarily pension funds and investment arms of insurance firms, 
institutions with relatively longer time horizons, that have been the most frequent advocates for disclosure 
of sustainability data.  
Research  has  shown  that disclosure  of  sustainability  data  has  economic  effects.  Yu,  Du  and 
Bhattacharya  (2014)  found  abnormal  stock  price  reactions  around  the  disclosure  of  sustainability 
information. Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim (2014) found that firms with better sustainability disclosure 
have lower capital constraints and better access to finance. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) showed that firms 
experience a decrease in cost of equity capital after issuing a sustainability report. Dhaliwal et al. (2012) 
found that the issuance of stand-alone sustainability reports is associated with lower analyst forecast error 
and that this relation is stronger in countries that are more stakeholder-oriented and for firms and countries 
with more opaque financial disclosure. 
While the availability of sustainability data has been increasing, there have been several criticisms 
of their decision usefulness for investors. Perhaps, the most important criticism has been the lack of placing 
the data in the context of the strategy and the business model of the company as a result obscuring the 
relation between sustainability and financial performance (Eccles and Krzus, 2010). Closely linked is the 10 
 
criticism about the absence of an assessment of the materiality of the different sustainability issues. Surveys 
of institutional investors suggest that 73% of them disagree that sustainability reporting is linked to business 
strategy and risk, and 93% disagree that sufficient information is provided to assess financial materiality 
(Eurosif and ACCA 2013). The lack of link to financial issues is also reflected in the creation of the 
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) whose mission is to develop industry-specific guidance 
around materiality. Another criticism relates to the credibility of the data since separate sustainability 
reports frequently obtain ‘Limited’ assurance instead of ‘Reasonable’, if any assurance at all. Industry 
observers suggest that performing an audit of sustainability data is several orders less expensive compared 
to financial data, because of the lower level of assurance provided. Moreover, timeliness of the data is 
another concern because sustainability reports typically come out well after the financial reports of the firm. 
This  timing  discrepancy  decreases  the  amount  of  investor  attention  with  fewer  investors  reading 
sustainability reports.4 
IR is a new form of reporting that attempts to mitigate all the above deficiencies. Investors seem to 
support IR. Eighty percent of investors surveyed believe that IR will be useful or very useful for increasing 
the reliability and relevance of sustainability information (A4S and GRI 2012). However, IR has a short 
history, its meaning is still evolving, and only recently has a framework been developed that can provide 
companies guidance on what constitutes an IR. Like other new management concepts, IR first started in 
practice. The first companies to produce a self-declared IR were the Danish enzymes company Novozymes 
(in 2002), the Brazilian cosmetics fragrances company Natura (in 2003), and the Danish pharmace utical 
company  Novo  Nordisk  (in  2004). 5  Starting  in  2010,  all  South  African  companies  listed  on  the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange were required to issue an IR or explain why they were not doing so.6  
                                                           
4 See here for a discussion of the usefulness of ESG data for investors: 
https://www.globalreporting.org/information/events/conference2013/news/Pages/Updates/2-4.aspx  
5 One Report: Integrated Reporting for a Sustainable Strategy by Robert G. Eccles and Michael P. Krzus, John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. Hoboken, New Jersey, 2010, Chapter 1. 
6 Ibid., p. 164. 11 
 
There is no clear way to measure the number of companies that are issuing integrated reports. 
Rather the practice of IR is a matter of degrees. There are companies that are doing more or less IR and 
firms that practice to a certain extent IR while not describing their reports as integrated (Eccles and Serafeim 
2011). For example, IRRC and SII (2013) found that among S&P 500 companies only seven labeled their 
reports as integrated but almost all (499) made at least one sustainability related disclosure that was linked 
to financial performance. Similarly, 65% made a sustainability related disclosure in 10-K with monetary 
estimates and 54% discussed product formulations to address sustainability challenges. The difficulty to 
identify IR and have a universally accepted definition of what constitutes an IR is reflected in the fact that 
through 2012 there were no guidelines on what constituted an IR with the exception of a brief document 
prepared in early 2011 by the Integrated Reporting Committee of South Africa. No formal guidance about 
integrated reporting existed until the International Integrated Reporting Committee (IIRC) published its 
“International <IR> Framework” (<IR> Framework) in December 2013. 
A central tenet of IR is placing the sustainability activities of a firm within the context of an 
organization’s strategy and business model. Therefore, emphasis is given on the material sustainability 
issues that are most likely to affect the ability of an organization to create value in the future. Materiality is 
one of the guiding principles in the <IR> framework developed by the IIRC and its importance is reflected 
in the creation of SASB whose mission is to establish industry-based sustainability standards for the 
recognition and disclosure of material environmental, social and governance impacts by companies traded 
on U.S. exchanges. A complementary guiding principle is the connectivity of information; IR should show 
the interrelatedness and dependencies of the different factors that affect the value creation process inside 
an organization.7 Ninety-two percent of investors surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that financial and 
other sustainability information should be more integrated (Eurosif and ACCA 2013). 
Increased relevance of the reported information is not the only potential benefit. IR could raise the 
credibility of the sustainability data since the information is   now part of regulatory filings that are 
                                                           
7 See http://www.theiirc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/13-12-08-THE-INTERNATIONAL-IR-FRAMEWORK-
2-1.pdf  12 
 
scrutinized by regulators and to a greater extent by auditors. Including sustainability data in an annual report 
does not necessarily mean that the audit opinion provided for the financial numbers covers the sustainability 
data as well.8 However, the integrated reporting process has been shown to improve the credibility and 
accuracy of sustainability information due to an improvement in the management information systems and 
control procedures related to the sustainability data (Eccles and Krzus 2010).  Many prior studies have 
shown that credible information is more likely to be used by investors. For example, Kallapur and Kwan 
(2004) examine the value relevance and reliability of brand assets recognized by UK firms, and the stock 
price reaction to the announcement of brand capitalization. They find that brand assets are value relevant, 
but the market capitalization rates of brands of firms with low contracting incentives are higher than those 
of firms with high contracting incentives to capitalize and overstate brand values. Investors perceive brand 
values disclosed by firms with high contracting incentives as less reliable and as a result impound them less 
in market prices. 
Finally, with IR, sustainability data are reported on a timelier basis since they are disclosed at the 
same time as the financial data. While annual financial reports are often disclosed 90 days after the end of 
the financial year, sustainability r eports are often disclosed 180 days after. 9 This reporting lag makes 
sustainability data less timely potentially reducing their usefulness to investors. Past studies document the 
importance of timeliness to investors. For example, Givoly and Palmon (1982) show that the information 
content of earnings announcements decreases as the reporting lag increases. Collins et al. (1994) show that 
lack of timeliness in earnings explains the low contemporaneous relation between earnings and stock 
                                                           
8 I collect data from the GRI website on firms’ assurance practices. I find that for a sample of global companies that 
file their integrated or sustainability reports with the GRI, the probability of external assurance for the whole report is 
45 percent higher for integrated reports. Moreover, the likelihood of ‘Reasonable’ assurance compared to ‘Limited’ 
assurance increases for firms issuing integrated reports. These results are obtained using logistic regressions with 
industry and country fixed effects for the years 2012 and 2013. 
9 I do not have data on the date of release of a sustainability or integrated report. However, I collected from the GRI 
website for a sample of global companies the date that companies file their report with the GRI. Controlling for 
industry and country fixed effects I find that integrated reports are filed on average 22 days earlier after the end of the 
financial year than sustainability reports. 13 
 
returns. A rich literature in accounting documents timeliness as an important qualitative characteristic of 
accounting information (Basu 1997).  
Therefore, long-term investors, who are interested in relevant, credible, and timely information for 
assessing the long-term prospects of the firm, could be more likely to hold shares of firms that practice IR. 
These firms presumably provide information that is value relevant in the long-term, decreasing information 
asymmetry between interested investors and corporate managers thereby decreasing financing frictions and 
monitoring costs. Thereby, all else equal, I expect long-term investors will be attracted to firms that practice 
IR. 
However, there are a number of reasons why this association might not exist. I separate the reasons 
to  those  that  are  conditional  on  the  presence  of  sustainability  reporting  and  those  irrespective  of 
sustainability  reporting.  First,  independent  of  the  presence  of  sustainability  reporting,  IR  will  not  be 
associated with a more long-term investor base if sustainability data are not value relevant. In other words, 
if environmental and social performance are not related to financial performance then the environmental 
and social data are value irrelevant and most long-term investors will ignore them.10 If this is true then 
absent of controls for sustainability reporting there should be no relation between IR and the type of investor 
base. While debate still exists about what is the relation between sustainability and financial performance, 
nevertheless there is evidence that investors actually seek the data (Eccles, Krzus and Serafeim 2011), sell-
side  analyst  perceptions  about  the  implications  of  sustainability  performance  on  future  financial 
performance have changed over time (Ioannou and Serafeim 2014), and that variation in sustainability 
disclosure across firms explains variation in access to finance (Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim 2014), cost of 
capital (Dhaliwal et al. 2011), and analyst forecast errors (Dhaliwal et al. 2012). Moreover, other studies 
have shown that mandatory sustainability disclosure decreases information asymmetry (Hung, Shi and 
                                                           
10 A relation between IR and type of investor base can still exist even if sustainability data are value irrelevant if many 
institutional investors use the data because of ethical reasons and not to maximize risk-adjusted performance. While 
there are certainly investors with ethical motives, their size and number is not likely to be enough to make a difference 
in my results. 14 
 
Wang  2013)  and  that  voluntary  sustainability  disclosure  generates  abnormal  stock  returns  around 
announcement (Griffin and Sun 2013). 
Second, in the presence of sustainability reporting, IR will not be associated with a more long-term 
investor  base if  the  provision  of the sustainability  data  as a  separate  report is  sufficient to decrease 
information asymmetry between interested investors and corporate managers and integration provides no 
benefit in terms of relevance, credibility and timeliness. If this is true then in the presence of controls for 
sustainability reporting there should be no relation between IR and investor base. This is plausible given 
the relatively underdeveloped state of IR in the US (Eccles and Serafeim 2011) and the fact that material 
sustainability risks and opportunities are rarely discussed in regulatory filings, namely 10-K, in the US 
(IRRC and SII 2013). 
 
3.  Sample and Data 
To construct the sample I collect data on IR from Thomson Reuters ASSET4. ASSET4 is a division of 
Thomson Reuters that specializes in providing objective, relevant, auditable and systematic sustainability 
information and investment analysis tools to professional investors who built their portfolios by integrating 
sustainability data into their traditional investment analysis. It is estimated that investors representing more 
than $3 trillion of assets under management use the ASSET4 data, including prominent investment houses 
such as BlackRock. Specially trained research analysts collect 900 evaluation points per firm, where all the 
primary data used must be objective and publically available. After gathering the data every year the 
analysts transform it into consistent units to enable quantitative analysis. The ASSET4 database has been 
used in prior studies to measure sustainability performance or disclosure (Ioannou and Serafeim 2012; Chen 
et al. 2013). 
ASSET4 measures “a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards the creation 
of  an  overarching  vision  and  strategy  integrating  financial  and  extra-financial  aspects.  It  reflects  a 
company's capacity to convincingly show and communicate that it integrates the economic (financial), 15 
 
social and environmental dimensions into its day-to-day decision-making processes.” ASSET4 provides a 
score for a firm’s IR ranging from zero to 100. This score is a composite index of different disclosures, 
such as whether the company “is reporting about the challenges or opportunities of integrating financial 
and extra-financial issues, and the dilemmas and trade-offs it faces”, “explicitly integrates financial and 
extra-financial factors in its management discussion and analysis (MD&A) section in the annual report”, 
“has set targets or objectives to be achieved on the integration of ESG issues into its strategy and day-to-
day decision making”, and “explains how it engages with its stakeholders.” I also use an alternative measure 
of IR using data from Sustainable Asset Management that I describe in the next section. 
Between 2002 and 2010 ASSET4 included about 6,036 observations for US-listed firms with 
available data on investor holdings. I am able to collect all the necessary data to conduct the analysis for 
almost all firms and after requiring data on all variables, described below, the sample includes 5,726 
observations. Average IR score in the sample is 39 with a standard deviation of 29 suggesting significant 
variation in the practice of IR (Table 1).  
I collect data on types of institutional investors from Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings. 
While ASSET4 is an international dataset, the institutional holdings data are available only for firms listed 
in the US, therefore the resulting sample includes only US-listed firms. The vast majority of sample firms 
are US with less than 5 percent being Canadian. Bushee (1998) classifies institutional investors in three 
types: transient, dedicated, and quasi-index. Transient investors have low holding periods, high portfolio 
turnover and a high number of holdings. Dedicated investors have large holding periods, low portfolio 
turnover and a more concentrated portfolio. Quasi-index investors have a portfolio that closely follows a 
stock market index with small deviations. I define a variable (LT Investor) that measures the extent that the 
investor base of a firm is tilted towards dedicated and away from transient investors as the difference 
between the percentage of shares held by dedicated and transient investors. Consistent with the literature, 
average LT Investor is negative (-6 percent) suggesting that more investors are transient rather than 
dedicated (Table 1). On average 9.4 percent of the shares are held by dedicated investors and 15.5 percent 
by transient. Quasi-index funds hold on average 46.8 percent of the shares of the firms in my sample.  16 
 
Apart from IR, I also collect data from ASSET4 on governance practices that have been shown to 
be associated with investor clientele (Bushee, Carter, and Gerakos 2009). Specifically, I collect data on 
whether the board of a company is classified (7 percent of the sample) or staggered (45 percent of the 
sample), and whether a supermajority vote is required to make decisions (32 percent of the sample). 
Moreover, I collect data on the percentage of quantitative sustainability metrics disclosed by a firm out of 
121 metrics collected by ASSET4 (Disclosure Quantity), whether a firm issues a separate sustainability 
report (Sustainability Report), and whether the firm follows the GRI guidelines (GRI). The GRI guidelines 
are by far the most followed principles for sustainability reporting with over 2,000 companies around the 
world using them as of 2013. On average sample firms disclose 54 percent of the sustainability metrics 
followed by ASSET4, 21 percent of the firm-years have a sustainability report and 13 percent follow the 
GRI guidelines (Table 1). Controlling for the quantity of sustainability disclosure, whether the firm issues 
a  sustainability  report  and  follows  GRI  guidelines  allows  making  inferences  about  the  incremental 
association between IR and investor base that cannot be explained by a firm’s supply of stand-alone 
sustainability data. 
I collect from Worldscope a variety of accounting and stock market data that serve as control 
variables. I include in all specifications as controls a firm’s size as measured by the natural logarithm of 
sales, leverage defined as total debt over total assets, earnings yield, book-to-market ratio, dividend yield, 
past one-year sales growth, equity beta, stock return volatility, and past one-year stock return. All these 
variables have been shown to be associated with the investor base of a firm (Bushee and Noe 2000). Table 
1 presents summary statistics for all variables. 
The final sample includes 1,114 unique firms and 5,726 observations between 2002 (the earliest 
year ASSET4 provides data) and 2010. In analyses where I include firm fixed effects I require at least four 
years of data for each firm in the sample to ensure that there is enough within-firm variation. Imposing this 
restriction decreases the sample to 649 unique firms and 4,684 observations. 
Table 2 shows univariate correlations across all variables. Firms that practice more IR and firms 
with better EESG performance have a more long-term oriented investor base. While IR exhibits a positive 17 
 
relation with LT Investor, Disclosure Quantity, Sustainability Report, and GRI all exhibit a negative relation 
with LT Investor suggesting that the positive relation between IR and LT Investor is not reflecting just a 
positive relation between generic disclosure and a long-term investor base. Not surprisingly, firms that 
practice more IR are more likely to issue a sustainability report, follow GRI guidelines, and have better 
EESG performance. Firms that issue a sustainability report, follow GRI guidelines, and have better EESG 
performance  are larger. The  rest  of the  variables  exhibit economically  important  but  more  moderate 
correlations. 
 
4.  Analysis and Results 
4.1. Baseline Results 
Table 3 shows the results of estimating an ordinary least squares model with double clustered standard 
errors at the firm and year level to mitigate serial autocorrelation in the errors. The first specification 
includes industry and year fixed effects as well as accounting and stock market variables as controls. The 
coefficient on IR is positive and significant suggesting that firms practicing IR have a more long-term 
investor base. The coefficient is 0.035 with a t-statistic of 3.58. Approximately, the economic effect 
suggested by the estimates is about two percent shift in investor base (or about twenty percent of the LT 
Investor standard deviation) for an interquartile change in IR. 
The specification includes controls for the quantity of sustainability disclosures. The estimated 
coefficient on this variable is insignificant suggesting that the number of sustainability metrics a firm 
discloses is not related to a firm’s investor base. The specification also includes controls for whether the 
firm issues a separate sustainability report, whether the sustainability report follows the GRI guidelines, 
governance aspects of the organization, and the EESG performance score assigned to each firm by ASSET4 
since  all  of  them  might  be  correlated  omitted  variables.  The  insignificant  coefficient  on  the  EESG 
performance score is likely an outcome of investors following both positive screening and engagement 
strategies.  In  positive  screening  strategies,  investors  choose  companies  with  relatively  better  EESG 18 
 
performance with the expectation that better EESG performance will lead to better stock price performance 
in the future. In contrast, in engagement strategies, investors choose companies with relatively poor EESG 
performance  with  the  expectation  that  after  engaging  with  the  company  the  improvement  in  EESG 
performance will lead to better stock price performance. Because investors follow both strategies there is 
no significant relation between EESG performance scores and investor base.  
In the second specification, I include firm fixed effects to test whether potentially a firm-persistent 
correlated omitted variable causes IR and investor base to be related. However, I reject this hypothesis since 
the coefficient on IR remains positive and significant. The coefficient is 0.023 with a t-statistic of 3.03. The 
explanatory power of the model increases from 21 to 57 percent suggesting that a firm’s investor base is 
fairly stable in terms of long-term orientation. Moreover, while the coefficient on IR continues to be 
significant, the negative coefficient on Sustainability Reporting becomes insignificant. The same is true for 
the coefficient on Staggered Board. Approximately, the economic effect suggested by the estimates is about 
one percent shift in investor base (or about ten percent of the LT Investor standard deviation) for an 
interquartile change in IR. 
To examine the robustness of these results to using an alternative measure of IR I use data from 
Sustainable Asset Management (SAM), a Swiss buy-side fund management company that constructs the 
Dow Jones Sustainability index and specializes in sustainable investing. SAM provided these proprietary 
data on a confidential basis and the data are not publicly available. SAM collected data for the first time in 
2010 about the level of integration of environmental and social information in annual reports (Eccles and 
Serafeim, 2011). Specifically, analysts at SAM collected data on whether environmental or social narrative 
information or KPIs are integrated in annual reports. To construct an index of IR I give one point for whether 
a firm integrates environmental narrative information, social narrative information, environmental KPIs, or 
social KPIs. The index therefore ranges from zero to four. About 40 percent of the firms receive a score of 
zero and only five percent of the firms receive a score of four. Because SAM collects data on the largest 
2,500 companies worldwide by market capitalization, the sample is reduced to 493 US firms. I estimate an 
ordinary least squares specification with these 493 observations for the year of 2010. The results in the third 19 
 
specification  show  that  this  alternative  IR  variable  is  positively  associated  with  LT  Investor. 
Approximately, the economic effect suggested by the estimates is about 2.5 percent shift in investor base 
(or about 25 percent of the LT Investor standard deviation) for an interquartile change in IR. I conclude that 
the results documented so far are robust to an alternative way of measuring the IR variable and using an 
alternative database. Therefore, the results are not specific to the ASSET4 database. 
  In terms of other control variables the estimated coefficients are consistent with the literature 
(Bushee 2001). Companies with higher stock market liquidity have relatively more transient investors as 
these investors need the liquidity in order to move in and out of the stock at a low cost. Moreover, firms 
with better past performance have relatively more transient investors reflecting the momentum strategies 
employed by such investors. 
4.2. Lead-Lag Analysis 
While the estimates in Table 3 suggest a robust relation between IR and investor clientele even in the 
presence of several control factors, the direction of causality is not clear. It might be that firms that practice 
IR signal their type and attract investors with similar preferences and time horizons. Or it might be the case 
that firms practice or not IR because of the preferences of their investor base. In other words, dedicated 
investors might force companies to practice IR or transient investors might discourage companies from 
practicing IR. To shed further light on the direction of causality I estimate lead-lag models where I calculate 
one-year and three-year difference in all variables and I lag either the changes in IR or the changes in LT 
Investor. I calculate both one and three-year changes because I am not certain how fast investors might 
react to the information or companies to investor pressure. 
The first two specifications in Table 4 lag the change in IR and suggest that the lagged change in IR 
leads changes in LT Investor. In contrast the last two specifications reveal no relation between lag change 
in LT investor and future change in IR. IR leads investor base rather than the other way round. These results 
provide evidence in support of a mechanism where firms practice IR and attract investors that find this 
information most useful for their objectives. 20 
 
4.3. Moderating Effects 
The results so far suggest that there is a robust positive association between IR and investor clientele. This 
association is likely to be moderated though by characteristics of the firm. First, I expect that incentives for 
the supply and demand of IR are stronger for firms with higher growth opportunities. Since the cash flows 
supporting the current market capitalization of these firms are forecasted to materialize further in the future, 
information about the long-term prospects of the business is more critical for these firms. I proxy for the 
growth opportunities of a firm using the price-to-book ratio.  
Second, I expect the relation between IR and investor clientele to be weaker for family firms. A 
long literature argues that family firms have a more long-term orientation compared to other firms and they 
are more likely to better manage their relations with employees, customers and communities (Le Breton-
Miller and Miller 2006). Therefore, I expect that the signaling value of IR is lower for family firms. Twenty 
percent of the observations in my sample are family firms. I follow Anderson and Reeb (2003) and 
Villalonga and Amit (2007) and define a family firm as a firm whose founder or a member of the family 
either by blood or marriage is an officer, a director, or the owner of at least five percent of the firm’s equity 
either individually or as a group.  
Third, I expect that the strength of the relation between IR and investor clientele will increase with 
the magnitude and probability of future penalties and risks arising from changing regulations and changing 
social expectations that are likely to disrupt a firm’s business model. I use a firm’s presence in a ‘sin’ 
industry as a proxy for the severity and probability of future penalties. Firms involved in alcohol, firearms, 
tobacco, gambling, nuclear and military business as coded in the KLD database are classified as sin firms. 
Twelve percent of the observations are classified in sin industries.  
Fourth, I expect that the relation between IR and investor clientele will be weaker for firms 
exhibiting very high past volatility in their IR practice. Commitment in disclosure has been shown to be 
necessary  condition for credible  disclosure  (Leuz  and  Verrecchia  2000). These  firms  do  not show a 
commitment in IR thereby decreasing the credibility of IR and its associated impact on investor clientele. I 21 
 
calculate the standard deviation of firm-specific IR over the past three years as an inverse measure of 
consistency and I designate the top ten percent of the distribution as High IR Volatility. 
  Table 5 presents the results of how these four variables moderate the relation between IR and 
investor clientele. The relation between IR and LT Investor is stronger for firms with higher price-to-book 
ratios (PTB) and sin firms. One standard deviation increase in PTB increases the economic effect of an 
interquartile change in IR from one percent to two percent shift in investor base. For a sin firm the economic 
effect increases from one percent to five percent shift in investor base. The relation is weaker for family 
firms and firms with high past IR volatility. For nonfamily firms an interquartile change in IR shifts the 
investor base towards long-term investors by almost two percent; by comparison the economic effect for 
the whole sample is one percent. The same is true for firms that do not exhibit high IR volatility. These 
results show that the relation between IR and investor clientele is predictably moderated by firm growth 
opportunities, ownership structure, the social legitimacy of the business, and disclosure commitment.  
4.4. Sustainability Events 
Past research attempts to identify what causes a firm to improve its environmental or social performance 
and increase transparency on those issues. I exploit findings from this line of research to understand how 
sustainability events lead to increases in IR and how this change in IR relates to future changes in investor 
base. Specifically, I consider the role of shareholder engagement with the company on environmental and 
social issues and how firms respond to sustainability-related crises. 
4.4.1.  Shareholder Engagement 
While the results so far suggest that changes in IR lead to changes in investor base rather than vice versa, 
investor  engagement  on  sustainability  issues  has  been  steadily  increasing  (DB  Advisors  2009).  An 
interesting question is whether such engagement is effective in influencing companies to practice IR and in 
turn  whether  such  investor-led  increases  in  IR  lead  to  changes  in  investor  base.  I  collect  data  on 
engagements by institutional investors on social and environmental issues from RiskMetrics to construct 22 
 
two variables.11 The first variable, Activism, takes the value of one if an investor has filed a proxy on a 
social and/or environmental issue for a company or otherwise it takes the value of zero. Eighteen percent 
of the firm-year observations in our sample have shareho lder proposals on social and/or environmental 
issues (Table 1). The second variable, Reporting Activism, takes the value of one if the variable Activism 
is one and the investor demands that the company reports more information  or it takes the value of zero 
otherwise. Five percent of the firm-year observations in our sample have reporting related social and/or 
environmental shareholder proposals. I expect that both variables will be related positively to changes in 
IR. The dataset includes proposals that came to a vote as well as those that did not (e.g., because they were 
withdrawn by the proponent or allowed to be omitted from the proxy by the SEC). 
Table 6 shows that indeed investor engagement is positively associated with changes in IR. Both 1 
and 3-year changes in IR are related to both activism and reporting activism. The result suggests that in 
general activism around environmental and/or social issues leads to an increase in the IR score of about 5 
or 2 points over 3 or 1-year. Activism that relates also to reporting practices further increases IR by 6 or 4 
points for a cumulative effect of 11 or 6 points. The third specification docu ments a similar effect in a levels 
specification with firm-fixed effects. Investor activism variables are constructed in this specification as 
indicator variables that take the value of one for the year on and after investor engagement to differentiate 
between years before and after the engagement. These are economically large estimates suggesting that 
activism has a large effect on IR.  
Extracting the predicted component from the fixed effects specification allow us to test if  this 
activism-led change in IR is associated with a change in investor base. The fourth specification shows that 
this incremental IR due to investor activism is related to higher levels of long-term investor holdings. The 
coefficient on predicted IR, from the first stage in the third specification, is significant and positive. This 
result is interesting in the light of recent evidence that investor engagements on environmental or social 
                                                           
11 Not all investor engagements are public. Many investment funds engage privately with companies and I am unable 
to include those private engagements. If these private engagements are more effective at increasing IR then the 
estimated coefficient on the activism variables is likely to be biased towards zero and I will be unable to reject the null 
hypothesis. 23 
 
issues lead to operating improvements and superior stock price performance for the firm (Dimson, Karakas 
and Li 2013). 
4.4.2.  Sustainability Crisis 
Past research has shown that major concerns about corporate conduct and the impact of a company on the 
environment or society have been the catalysts for firms to engage with sustainability (Eccles, Miller and 
Serafeim 2012). It is likely that such events could lead to more IR as firms attempt to explain how they are 
dealing with the problems and managing risks associated with future events. I collect data from KLD, a 
frequently used dataset that provides information on a firm’s sustainability performance. KLD provides 
data on the number of concerns a firm faces regarding human rights, diversity, employee relations, product, 
governance and environmental issues. I calculate the sum of those concerns and I designated the top quintile 
of firms as facing a crisis. Firms that face a large number of concerns are more likely to receive negative 
media attention and pressure from civil society to address these concerns. Indicatively, the number of total 
concerns for the median firm in my sample is two. The firms I designated as facing a crisis have at least 
five concerns and up to 18.   
Table 7 shows that indeed the presence of a crisis is positively associated with changes in IR. Both 
1 and 3-year changes in IR are related to the crisis variable. The result suggests that a crisis around 
environmental and/or social issues leads to an increase in the IR score of about 5 or 1 points over 3 or 1-
year. The third specification documents a similar effect in a levels specification with firm-fixed effects. As 
before the indicator variable is transformed in this specification to take the value of one for years on and 
after the presence of a crisis. These are economically significant estimates suggesting that crisis has an 
effect on IR. Extracting the predicted component from the fixed effects specification allow us to test if this 
crisis-led change in IR is associated with a change in investor base. The fourth specification shows that this 
incremental IR due to the presence of a crisis is related to higher levels of long-term investor holdings. The 
coefficient on predicted IR, from the first stage in the third specification, is significant.  
4.5. Attracting Dedicated Investors or Discouraging Transient Investors 24 
 
So far I have documented a robust relation between IR and investor clientele. However, LT Investor 
comprises two variables: the percentage of shares held by dedicated investors minus the percentage of 
shares held by transient investors. It is not clear if the result is driven by just one of these variables or both. 
For example, is it the case that firms that practice IR signal their type only to dedicated investors attracting 
them or is it the case at the same time that they are unattractive to transient investors.  
The results in Table 8 Panels A and B show that both effects exist although the effect on dedicated 
investors is the most robust. The coefficient on IR is positive and significant when the dependent variable 
is percentage of shares held by dedicated investors. In contrast, the coefficient on IR is negative and 
significant when the dependent variable is percentage of shares held by transient investors. The coefficient 
is negative but insignificant in the absence of firm fixed effects though. In the cross-section IR does not 
explain variation in the presence of transient investors. However, changes within a firm of IR do explain 
changes in transient ownership. Studies have shown that firms that exert more efforts to improve their 
environmental and social performance are less likely to engage in accruals and real earnings management 
(Kim, Park and Wier 2012), thereby potentially limiting the potential for transient investors to profit from 
momentum trading. 
A few of the results are especially worth noting. First, firms that practice more IR but there is a 
high volatility in IR tend to attract more transient investors while they are unable to attract dedicated 
investors. These firms are not committed to IR thereby not attracting dedicated investors. Moreover, the 
volatility in IR attracts transient investors which are likely to benefit from volatile disclosure practices. 
Second, investor-induced IR has a positive effect on dedicated investor holdings but no effect on transient 
investors. This makes sense because dedicated investor are also the investors that filed the shareholder 
resolution that led to the increase in IR. Third, the crisis-induced IR has a negative effect on transient 
investor holdings but no effect on dedicated investors. Dedicated investors seem to be reluctant to increase 
holdings on companies that practice IR but have experienced a sustainability crisis.  
4.6. A Preliminary Analysis of Relevance, Reliability and Timeliness 25 
 
Section 2 hypothesizes that a relation between IR and investor base could be driven by IR increasing the 
relevance, reliability and timeliness of reported sustainability information. While a robust relation has been 
shown in the previous analyses, an open question is the relative importance of relevance, reliability and 
timeliness in driving this relation. Ideally, I would be able to construct variables measuring each one of 
these attributes and include them in the model to test which variables mediate the relation between IR and 
LT Investor. IR is capturing increased relevance due to integration but it is correlated with increased 
reliability and timeliness. To isolate, as much as possible, the effect of relevance I need to include variables 
for reliability and timeliness.  
I proxy for reliability by hand-collecting data on whether the whole report is audited by an external 
party, if the auditor is a Big 4 firm, and whether the audit firm provides ‘Reasonable’ or ‘Limited’ assurance 
on the sustainability data. Given the size of the sample and because no readily available data exist on 
reliability and timeliness, I hand-collect data for a subsample. From the set of firms that issue sustainability 
reports and are included in the firm-fixed effects analysis I collect data on the first 100 companies ranked 
alphabetically (485 observations). I collect data alphabetically because I do not expect the first letter of a 
name of a company to be associated with any of my dependent or independent variables of interest. Ten 
percent of the sample has an external audit, and seven percent of the firms have a Big 4 audit firm. None of 
the audits provide Reasonable assurance. These low frequencies are not unexpected given that assurance of 
sustainability data is a relatively recent phenomenon (Simnett, Vanstraelen and Chua 2009). For this 
sample, I also hand-collect the reporting lag between financial year end and the date the report was issued 
to measure timeliness. The reporting lag is on average 172 days with a standard deviation of 36 days. The 
IR variable is positively correlated with both variables as expected. The correlation with external audit is 
0.32, Big 4 auditor 0.39 and timeliness (defined as the natural logarithm of max reporting lag plus one 
minus reporting lag) 0.28.  
I estimate the relations as in Table 3 with all the control variables and industry fixed effects (the 
fourth specification). In Table 9 I find that the coefficient on IR is still positive and significant (t=2.67) 
suggesting that when I control for reliability and timeliness, increased relevance due to increased integration 26 
 
is correlated with a more long-term investor base. I use the two audit variables in separate models as they 
are highly correlated but the estimated coefficients on the reliability variables are insignificant (Table 9 
tabulates the specification with the external audit variable). In this sample, it does not seem that increased 
reliability due to audit is correlated with a more long-term investor base. Readers should interpret these 
findings with caution for two reasons. First, this does not mean that increased reliability in IR can be the 
source of the relation between the IR variable and LT investor. External auditing is just one source of 
increased reliability. Other sources include improved information and management control systems inside 
the firm due to the practice of IR and I am unable to proxy for these. Second, as it was mentioned before 
auditing  of  sustainability  data  is  a  relatively  recent  phenomenon.  It  could  be  that  auditing  could  be 
significantly correlated in the future as more investors become familiar with the audit practices in this new 
domain. The timeliness variable loads with a positive and significant coefficient (t=1.98) suggesting that 
timeliness of sustainability data is correlated with a long-term investor base. When I estimate for this sample 
the same model but using firm instead of industry fixed effects (Table 3 column 5) the coefficient on the 
IR variable remains positive but now it is marginally significant (t=1.90) and both the reliability and 
timeliness variables are positive but insignificant. However, these results using firm fixed effects should be 
interpreted with caution given the low power of the test due to the decreased sample. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
IR  is  a  recent  reporting  innovation  that  has  gained  traction  across  both  the  corporate  and  investor 
community. In this paper, I examine how the practice of IR affects the investor base of the firm. I find that 
firms that practice more IR have a more long-term investor base and that this result is driven by having 
more dedicated and fewer transient investors. Using firm-fixed effects and lead-lag analysis I find evidence 
supporting a causal mechanism from IR to the investor base of a firm. The relation between IR and investor 
base is stronger for firms with high growth opportunities, nonfamily firms, sin firms, and firms with not 
very high volatility in past IR practice. Moreover, I find that investor activism on sustainability issues and 27 
 
the presence of a sustainability crisis leads firms to practice more IR and this change in IR is related to 
changes in investor base.  
  While the results I document appear robust to different specifications and variables used, my tests 
are not designed to address the question of which elements of IR are most effective at attracting long-term 
investors. As the content of IR becomes more standardized researchers will be able to create content 
classification and investigate their differential impact. I leave this important question for future research. 
Moreover, the paper does not provide any evidence that the information reported in IR allows long-term 
investors to make better decisions. While I document a matching between firms practicing IR and long-
term investors, there is an open question about how these investors change capital allocation decisions 
based on the information in IR. 
  It is important to note that IR is a costly activity and we are still not able to establish whether the 
benefits exceed the costs. So even if a company views attraction of long-term investors as a benefit, the 
costs should not be ignored. Anecdotal evidence and field data suggest that the most important costs involve 
investments in improving information systems for sustainability data, acquiring skills and expertise to use 
the data and integrate them in financial reporting, and increasing cross-functional collaboration inside the 
organization  to  produce  an  integrated  report.  Proprietary  costs  from  the  disclosure  of  competitive 
information might also be added to the costs of IR, although no evidence exists to date suggesting that IR 
increases the proprietary costs of disclosure. 
  IR is a rare experiment in fundamentally changing corporate reporting that represents a rich area 
for future research. We still know relatively little about its causes and consequences. More research is 
needed on what are the motivations of different firms that practice IR. Similarly, more research could shed 
light on whether and how IR instills ‘integrated thinking’ inside the firm. While IR should reflect the 
integrated thinking inside a firm it could also serve as the discipline for managers to change resource 
allocation decisions inside the organization.   28 
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Appendix: Description of Variables 
Variables  Description 
LT Investor  % of shares held by dedicated minus transient investors 
Dedicated  % of shares held by dedicated investors  
Transient  % of shares held by transient investors 
Institutional  % of shares held by dedicated, transient and quasi-index investors 
IR 
Measures a company's management commitment and effectiveness towards the creation of an 
overarching vision and strategy integrating financial and extra-financial aspects. It reflects a 
company's capacity to convincingly show and communicate that it integrates the economic, social 
and environmental dimensions into its day-to-day decision-making processes 
Disclosure Quantity  % of quantitative ESG metrics that a firm disclosed for a fiscal year 
Sustainability Report  Does the company publish a separate CSR/H&S/Sustainability report? 
GRI  Is the company's CSR report published in accordance with the GRI guidelines? 
Classified Board  Does the company have a classified board structure? 
Staggered Board  Does the company have a staggered board structure? 
Supermajority Vote  Does the company have a supermajority vote requirement or qualified majority (for amendments 
of charters and bylaws or lock-in provisions)? 
EESG Score 
An equal-weighted rating of a company's financial and extra-financial health based on the 
information in ASSET4's economic, environmental, social and corporate governance pillars. It 
reflects a balanced view of a company's performance in these four areas. 
Firm Size  Natural logarithm of firm sales 
Leverage  Total debt over total assets 
E/P  EPS over stock price at fiscal year end 
PTB  Stock price over book value per-share 
Dividend Yield  Dividends over stock price at fiscal year end 
Sales Growth  One year rate of change in sales 
Beta  Equity beta estimated using CAPM for monthly data over five years 
Volatility  Stock return volatility over the fiscal year 
Turnover  Dollar volume of trading over the year as a percentage of market value of equity at fiscal year end  
Stock Return  Stock return over the fiscal year 
Family Firm  Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm is controlled by a family 
Sin Firm  Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm is involved in gambling, tobacco, alcohol, 
firearms, nuclear or military business 
Sustainability Engagement  Indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm has had a shareholder resolution on 
environmental and/or social issues in that year 
Sustainability Reporting Engagement  Indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm has had a shareholder resolution on 
environmental and/or social issues that relates to reporting of data in that year 
Sustainability Engagement After  Indicator variable that takes the value of one for all years after a firm has had a shareholder 
resolution on environmental and/or social issues 
Sustainability Reporting Engagement After  Indicator variable that takes the value of one for all years after a firm has had a shareholder 
resolution on environmental and/or social issues that relates to reporting of data 
Sustainability Crisis  Indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm ranks in the top 20% of number of human 
rights, employee related, environmental, product, and diversity concerns in the KLD dataset 
Sustainability Crisis After 
Indicator variable that takes the value of one for years after a firm ranks in the top 20% of number 
of human rights, employee related, environmental, product, and diversity concerns in the KLD 
dataset 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable  N  Mean  Q1  Q3  St Dev 
Investor Ownership Data                
LT Investor       5,726   -6.06  -12.02  -0.24  10.64 
Dedicated       5,726   9.42  4.09  13.21  7.60 
Transient       5,726   15.48  9.47  20.42  8.09 
Quasi-index       5,726   46.83  39.99  56.08  13.81 
Institutional       5,726   71.73  61.75  85.89  18.93 
Reporting Data                
IR       5,726   39.09  18.13  61.78  28.99 
Disclosure Quantity       5,726   54.17  50.41  57.85  6.19 
Sustainability Report       5,726   0.21  0.00  0.00  0.41 
GRI       5,726   0.13  0.00  0.00  0.34 
Governance Data                
Classified Board       5,726   0.07  0.00  0.00  0.26 
Staggered Board       5,726   0.45  0.00  1.00  0.50 
Supermajority Vote       5,726   0.32  0.00  1.00  0.47 
Firm Characteristics                
EESG Score       5,726   53.57  28.09  82.10  28.48 
Firm Size       5,726   8.45  7.55  9.34  1.37 
Leverage        5,726   24.13  9.67  34.99  18.51 
E/P       5,726   3.55  2.84  6.96  9.75 
PTB       5,726   3.31  1.56  3.94  3.07 
Dividend Yield       5,726   1.64  0.00  2.50  1.94 
Sales Growth       5,726   9.33  -0.70  16.48  21.98 
Beta       5,726   1.17  0.82  1.50  0.57 
Volatility       5,726   28.44  21.41  32.72  9.43 
Turnover       5,726   271.22  123.24  318.07  263.17 
Stock Return       5,726   16.25  -9.49  34.25  48.62 
Family Firm       5,726   0.20  0.00  0.00  0.40 
Sin Firm       5,726   0.12  0.00  0.00  0.33 
Shareholder Activism Data                
Sustainability Engagement       5,726   0.18  0.00  0.00  0.38 
Sustainability Reporting Engagement       5,726   0.05  0.00  0.00  0.21 
Sustainability Engagement After       5,726   0.29  0.00  1.00  0.45 
Sustainability Reporting Engagement After       5,726   0.12  0.00  0.00  0.32 
Sustainability Crisis Data                
Sustainability Crisis       5,726   0.21  0.00  0.00  0.41 
Sustainability Crisis After       5,726   0.26  0.00  1.00  0.44 
 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. 33 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
   Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18 
1  LT Investor  1.000                                   
2  IR  0.091  1.000                                 
3  Disclosure Quantity  -0.030  0.524  1.000                               
4  Sustainability Report  -0.047  0.619  0.460  1.000                             
5  GRI  -0.013  0.587  0.460  0.651  1.000                           
6  EESG Performance  0.074  0.595  0.576  0.530  0.488  1.000                         
7  Classified Board  0.043  -0.038  -0.048  -0.127  -0.092  -0.029  1.000                       
8  Staggered Board  -0.091  -0.138  -0.054  -0.098  -0.123  -0.097  0.243  1.000                     
9  Supermajority Vote  -0.106  -0.012  0.022  0.115  0.063  0.024  -0.105  0.214  1.000                   
10  Firm Size  0.139  0.433  0.315  0.301  0.249  0.530  0.036  -0.073  -0.047  1.000                 
11  Leverage  0.075  0.012  -0.012  0.014  -0.005  -0.086  0.000  -0.004  -0.013  0.024  1.000               
12  E/P  -0.003  0.085  0.080  0.055  0.043  0.170  -0.013  0.017  -0.015  0.157  -0.102  1.000             
13  PTB  0.037  0.004  0.122  -0.056  0.003  0.033  0.018  -0.037  -0.059  -0.080  -0.022  0.032  1.000           
14  Dividend Yield  0.075  0.136  -0.091  0.117  0.089  0.093  -0.017  -0.004  0.019  0.120  0.269  0.047  -0.157  1.000         
15  Sales Growth  -0.071  -0.050  -0.012  -0.084  -0.052  -0.018  -0.003  -0.008  -0.085  -0.050  -0.085  0.139  0.153  -0.149  1.000       
16  Beta  -0.100  -0.101  -0.051  -0.044  -0.080  -0.111  0.002  0.060  0.048  -0.105  -0.015  -0.160  -0.092  -0.194  0.031  1.000     
17  Volatility  -0.222  -0.211  -0.049  -0.113  -0.105  -0.247  -0.009  0.005  0.082  -0.314  -0.117  -0.271  0.017  -0.417  0.079  0.404  1.000   
18  Turnover  -0.251  -0.122  0.021  -0.012  -0.026  -0.113  -0.061  0.018  0.123  -0.104  0.006  -0.270  -0.097  -0.026  0.009  0.282  0.451  1.000 
19  Stock Return  -0.054  -0.023  0.027  -0.018  -0.002  -0.025  -0.014  0.008  0.066  -0.117  -0.036  0.073  0.182  -0.233  0.044  0.114  0.219  -0.250 
 
Pearson correlation statistics. All variables are defined in the Appendix.   34 
 
Table 3: IR and Investor Clientele 
Parameter   Estimate   t  Estimate   t  Estimate   t 
Intercept  -13.269  -3.20  -3.783  -0.38  -0.130  -0.02 
IR  0.035  3.58  0.023  3.03  0.669  2.03 
Disclosure Quantity  -0.012  -0.19  -0.027  -0.54  0.099  0.47 
Sustainability Report  -2.099  -2.84  -0.832  -1.00  -0.009  -0.40 
GRI  -0.498  -0.94  -0.791  -1.44  0.009  0.47 
EESG Performance  0.005  0.44  -0.016  -0.99  0.510  0.15 
Classified Board  0.116  0.18  -0.068  -0.16  -1.649  -1.46 
Staggered Board  -1.378  -3.16  0.362  0.83  1.009  1.01 
Supermajority Vote  0.615  1.57  0.201  0.66  0.045  0.62 
Firm Size  0.538  2.64  0.574  1.29  0.536  1.12 
Leverage  0.040  2.61  0.008  0.46  0.040  1.41 
E/P  -0.069  -3.96  -0.066  -4.22  -0.057  -1.52 
PTB  0.062  0.95  -0.105  -1.69  0.006  0.11 
Dividend Yield  -0.021  -0.15  -0.091  -0.84  -0.210  -0.69 
Sales Growth  -0.031  -4.77  -0.021  -2.98  -0.054  -1.99 
Beta  -0.264  -0.45  1.974  0.31  -1.028  -1.08 
Volatility  -0.077  -2.09  -0.156  -3.83  -0.088  -1.97 
Turnover  -0.008  -8.03  -0.002  -2.31  -0.007  -3.27 
Stock Return  -0.016  -4.37  -0.010  -2.67  -0.018  -2.55 
Year f.e.  Yes    Yes    No   
Industry f.e.  Yes    No    Yes   
Firm f.e.  No    Yes    No   
Adj R-squared  21.4%    57.0%    13.8%   
N        5,726           4,684               493     
 
OLS regressions with robust and clustered standard errors at the firm and year level. The dependent variable is LT Investor which is calculated as the difference 
between percentage of shares owned by dedicated and transient investors for a given firm and year. All variables are defined in the Appendix. IR is defined as in 
the appendix except for IR in the third specification which is a measure of IR that ranges from 0 to 4 with higher values representing more integration of 
environmental and social information in financial reporting.    35 
 
Table 4: Lead-lag Analysis 
   Differences lagged IR  Differences lagged LT Investor 
   3-year  1-year  3-year  1-year 
Parameter   Estimate   t  Estimate   t  Estimate   t  Estimate   t 
Intercept  -3.038  -9.17  -1.625  -14.57  -1.311  -3.75  -0.597  -5.18 
IR  0.022  1.96  0.013  1.61  0.010  0.85  0.002  0.29 
Disclosure  0.115  1.57  -0.045  -0.82  0.147  1.93  0.092  1.64 
Sustainability Report  -0.022  -1.29  -0.003  -0.42  -0.020  -1.03  -0.004  -0.62 
GRI  -0.016  -1.05  -0.001  -0.14  -0.009  -0.99  -0.006  -0.96 
Classified Board  -0.018  -1.59  -0.004  -0.37  -0.010  -0.82  -0.010  -1.09 
Staggered Board  -0.619  -0.92  -0.900  -2.67  -0.195  -0.28  0.208  0.64 
Supermajority Vote  0.384  0.60  0.863  1.46  0.354  0.50  0.364  0.59 
EESG Score  -0.198  -0.42  0.252  0.82  -0.448  -0.88  0.140  0.42 
Firm Size  1.160  1.45  1.990  2.83  -0.008  -0.01  0.074  0.10 
Leverage  -0.006  -0.26  0.041  2.10  0.030  1.28  -0.008  -0.43 
E/P  -0.113  -4.20  -0.027  -2.22  -0.065  -2.76  -0.012  -0.90 
PTB  -0.129  -1.28  -0.035  -0.64  -0.176  -1.50  -0.058  -0.98 
Dividend Yield  -0.173  -1.20  -0.230  -2.30  -0.056  -0.32  0.270  2.81 
Sales Growth  -0.016  -2.12  -0.031  -4.86  0.003  0.44  0.018  3.25 
Volatility  -0.268  -4.76  -0.118  -2.28  -0.225  -3.93  -0.150  -3.09 
Turnover  -0.001  -1.25  0.000  0.27  -0.001  -0.75  0.001  1.35 
Stock Return  -0.002  -0.54  0.010  5.74  0.004  0.79  0.003  1.32 
Adj R-squared  2.2%    1.7%    1.9%    0.0%   
N         2,791             2,913             2,791             2,913     
 
OLS regressions with robust and clustered standard errors at the firm and year level. The dependent variable is change in LT Investor which is calculated as the 
difference between percentage of shares owned by dedicated and transient investors for a given firm and year. All independent variables are calculated as changes. 
The first and third specifications calculate changes for all variables over 3-years. The second and fourth specifications calculate changes for all variables over 1-
year. In the first two specifications change in IR is calculated for year t-1 while change in LT Investor is calculated in year t. In the last two specifications change 
in IR is calculated for year t while change in LT Investor is calculated in year t-1. 
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Table 5: IR and Investor Clientele: Moderating Effects 
Parameter   Estimate   t  Estimate   t  Estimate   t  Estimate   t  Estimate   t 
Intercept  -13.025  -3.15  -12.989  -3.12  -13.613  -3.35  -12.762  -3.11  -12.591  -3.14 
IR  0.026  2.23  0.042  4.24  0.027  2.66  0.043  4.11  0.033  2.65 
IR* PTB  0.003  1.88              0.003  1.68 
IR* Family Firm      -0.033  -2.08          -0.033  -2.04 
IR* Sin Firm          0.042  2.87      0.041  2.82 
IR* High IR Volatility              -0.057  -2.81  -0.059  -2.78 
PTB  -0.023  -0.24              -0.033  -0.36 
Family Firm      1.937  1.99          1.927  1.97 
Sin Firm          -3.385  -3.20      -3.344  -3.16 
High IR Volatility              3.470  2.27  3.669  2.30 
Firm Controls  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Year f.e.  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Industry f.e.  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Adj R-squared  20.7%    20.7%    21.0%    21.0%    21.4%   
N       5,726           5,726           5,726           5,726           5,726     
 
OLS regressions with robust and clustered standard errors at the firm and year level. The dependent variable is LT Investor which is calculated as the difference 
between percentage of shares owned by dedicated and transient investors for a given firm and year. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 6: Investor Engagement, IR and Investor Clientele 
Dependent Variable  3-year IR change  1-year IR change  IR  LT Investor 
Parameter  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t 
Intercept  5.582  7.43  1.563  7.20  38.865  0.87  -9.024  -0.91 
Sustainability Engagement  3.679  2.89  1.095  1.83         
Sustainability Reporting Engagement  6.064  2.73  3.276  2.42         
Sustainability Engagement After          3.557  3.34     
Sustainability Reporting Engagement After          6.858  5.20     
Predicted IR              0.140  2.76 
Disclosure Quantity              -0.028  -0.56 
Sustainability Report              -0.328  -0.86 
GRI              -0.591  -1.45 
EESG Performance              -0.008  -1.11 
Classified Board              -0.056  -0.13 
Staggered Board              0.430  0.99 
Supermajority Vote              0.221  0.73 
Firm Size  -0.307  -0.21  0.293  0.43  0.790  0.59  0.521  1.15 
Leverage  -0.005  -0.17  -0.022  -0.92  -0.034  -1.05  0.013  0.76 
E/P  0.063  1.62  -0.016  -0.73  0.066  1.95  -0.077  -4.76 
PTB  -0.181  -0.91  -0.071  -0.73  0.179  1.32  -0.130  -2.10 
Dividend Yield  0.468  1.41  0.329  2.02  0.229  0.84  -0.121  -1.12 
Sales Growth  -0.021  -1.32  0.003  0.57  -0.007  -0.42  -0.020  -2.92 
Beta  0.000  0.00  0.000  0.00  16.184  0.46  -0.323  -0.05 
Volatility  0.234  2.37  0.162  1.89  -0.025  -0.28  -0.156  -3.83 
Turnover  -0.002  -1.99  0.000  -0.02  -0.004  -2.51  -0.002  -1.68 
Stock Return  0.000  -0.25  0.001  0.51  -0.014  -1.83  -0.009  -2.21 
Year f.e.  No    No    Yes    Yes   
Firm f.e.  No     No     Yes     Yes    
Adj R-squared  1.5%    0.4%    68.7%    59.0%   
N  2,982     4,757     4,684     4,684    
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OLS regressions with robust and clustered standard errors at the firm and year level. In the first specification all variables are calculated as changes over a 3-year 
period except for Sustainability Engagement and Sustainability Reporting Engagement. In the second specification all variables are calculated as changes over a 
1-year period except for Sustainability Engagement and Sustainability Reporting Engagement. All variables are defined in the Appendix.   39 
 
Table 7: Sustainability Crisis, IR and Investor Clientele 
Dependent Variable  3-year IR change  1-year IR change  IR  LT Investor 
Parameter  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t 
Intercept  5.569  7.40  1.768  8.48  41.319  0.95  -26.860  -2.40 
Sustainability Crisis  4.833  3.69  0.890  1.96         
Sustainability Crisis After          3.060  2.16     
Predicted IR              0.557  3.48 
GRI              -0.021  -0.43 
Sustainability Report              -0.313  -0.83 
GRI              -0.575  -1.41 
EESG Performance              -0.007  -0.93 
Classified Board              0.010  0.02 
Staggered Board              0.370  0.85 
Supermajority Vote              0.203  0.67 
Firm Size  -0.204  -0.14  0.247  0.36  0.438  0.34  0.353  0.78 
Leverage  -0.003  -0.11  -0.019  -0.78  -0.037  -1.14  0.029  1.62 
E/P  0.052  1.34  -0.016  -0.73  0.069  2.05  -0.108  -5.54 
PTB  -0.167  -0.84  -0.059  -0.61  0.182  1.33  -0.210  -3.05 
Dividend Yield  0.539  1.60  0.363  2.23  0.232  0.84  -0.224  -1.97 
Sales Growth  -0.026  -1.59  0.003  0.49  -0.009  -0.56  -0.016  -2.29 
Beta  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.00  17.451  0.50  -7.569  -1.16 
Volatility  0.195  1.96  0.161  1.89  -0.014  -0.16  -0.153  -3.76 
Turnover  -0.002  -2.01  0.000  0.00  -0.004  -2.12  0.000  0.03 
Stock Return  0.000  0.18  0.001  0.53  -0.013  -1.72  -0.003  -0.72 
Year f.e.  No    No    Yes    Yes   
Firm f.e.  No    No    Yes    Yes   
Adj R-squared  1.1%    0.1%    68.7%    59.0%   
N  2,982     4,757     4,684     4,684    
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OLS regressions with robust and clustered standard errors at the firm and year level. In the first specification all variables are calculated as changes over a 3-year 
period except for Sustainability Crisis. In the second specification all variables are calculated as changes over a 1-year period except for Sustainability Crisis. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix.   41 
 
Table 8: IR and Investor Clientele 
 
Panel A: Dedicated Investors 
 
Dependent Variable  Dedicated Investors 
Parameter  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t 
IR  0.024  3.30  0.012  2.31  0.023  2.55         
IR* PTB          0.002  1.61         
IR* Family Firm          -0.021  -1.91         
IR* Sin Firm          0.016  2.11         
IR* High IR Volatility          -0.026  -2.69         
Predicted IR - Engagement              0.119  3.59     
Predicted IR - Crisis                  0.060  0.81 
Other firm controls  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Year f.e.  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Industry f.e.  Yes    No    Yes    No    No   
Firm f.e.  No     Yes     No     Yes     Yes    
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Panel B: Transient Investors 
 
Dependent Variable  Transient Investors 
Parameter  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t 
IR  -0.007  -1.15  -0.011  -2.39  -0.005  -0.66         
IR * PTB          -0.001  -1.19         
IR* Family Firm          0.014  1.44         
IR* Sin Firm          -0.025  -2.72         
IR* High IR Volatility          0.030  2.38         
Predicted IR - Engagement              -0.012  -0.39     
Predicted IR - Crisis                  -0.234  -2.57 
Other firm controls  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Year f.e.  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Industry f.e.  Yes    No    Yes    No    No   
Firm f.e.  No     Yes     No     Yes     Yes    
 
OLS regressions with robust and clustered standard errors at the firm and year level. The dependent variable in Panel A is calculated as the percentage of shares 
owned by dedicated investors and in Panel B as the percentage of shares owned by transient investors for a given firm and year. All specifications include all 
control variables included in the previous tables but they are not tabulated. The first and second specifications correspond to the fifth and seventh specifications 
respectively in Table 3. The third specification corresponds to the fifth specification in Table 5. The fourth and fifth specifications correspond to the fourth 
specification in Tables 6 and 7 respectively.  All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 9: Relevance, Reliability and Timeliness 
Parameter   Estimate   t  Estimate   t 
Intercept  9.558  0.53  6.332  0.53 
IR  0.031  2.67  0.020  1.90 
Audit  1.396  0.98  1.212  0.76 
Timeliness  0.100  1.98  0.067  1.44 
Firm controls   Yes    Yes   
Year f.e.  Yes    Yes   
Industry f.e.  Yes    No   
Firm f.e.  No    Yes   
Adj R-squared  20.2%    60.9%   
N          485              485     
 
OLS regressions with robust and clustered standard errors at the firm and year level. The dependent variable is LT Investor which is calculated as the difference 
between percentage of shares owned by dedicated and transient investors for a given firm and year. Audit is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the 
firm’s sustainability report is externally assured. Timeliness is the natural logarithm of max reporting lag plus one minus reporting lag between fiscal year end and 
date the report is issues publicly. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
 